| Inspection Type |
Referral
|
| Scope |
Complete
|
| Safety/Health |
Safety
|
| Close Conference |
2012-11-19
|
| Emphasis |
L: FALL, L: FORKLIFT, N: CHEMNEP, N: PSMPQV
|
| Case Closed |
2013-06-18
|
Related Activity
| Type |
Referral |
| Activity Nr |
418271 |
| Safety |
Yes |
| Health |
Yes |
|
Violation Items
| Citation ID |
01001 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100022 A02 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
1 |
| Nr Exposed |
31 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.22(a)(2): The floor of every workroom shall be maintained in a clean and, so far as possible, a dry condition. Where wet processes are used, drainage shall be maintained, and false floors, platforms, mats, or other dry standing places should be provided where practicable. (a) Sulfuric Acid Plant Battery Limits, Ingersoll Rand Ammonia Compressor Pad, West end - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to slipping and falling because of standing oily water in front of multiple safety switches and disconnect panels, i.e., five (5) Allen Bradley Safety Switches, a 120/240 VAC LT (Light) Disconnect Panel, a Siemens 480 VAC Transfer Disconnect Switch, etc. due to a lack of proper drainage. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01002 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100023 A08 II |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
5 |
| Nr Exposed |
24 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.23(a)(8)(ii): Every floor hole into which persons can accidentally walk shall be guarded by either: A floor hole cover of standard strength and construction. While the cover is not in place, the floor hole shall be constantly attended by someone or shall be protected by a removable standard railing. (a) Wastewater Treatment Plant, Access platform to top of Slaker, at bottom of Lime Silo - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to stepping into the following unguarded floor holes in the metal grate platform West of the top of the second fixed ladder above ground: (1) ~9 inches long by ~3 1/2 inches wide, near platform's south-center, and (2) ~4 inches wide by ~30-32 inches long, near platform's northeast corner. (b) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, deck over #4 Digester at #4 Agitator Gear Box - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to floor holes in metal-grate decking that were 38 5/16" X 4 1/2" X 31 1/2" deep and 6 1/4" X 43 1/2" X 31 1/2" deep. (c) Phosphoric-acid Plant, Rock Mill Area, at the Rock Mill Sump Pump for Pond Water, East of Slurry Tank - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to falling into the Rock Mill Sump for Pond Water due to grating missing over three openings (one measured 28" x 38" and two measured 11" x 10" each) under the sump pump drive motor. (d) DAP Plant, North Storm Water Sump Pump Pad - On or about June 26, 2012 employees were exposed to falling into unguarded holes in the support structure over the North Storm Water Sump due to the absence of grating over the openings. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01003 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100023 C01 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
14 |
| Nr Exposed |
40 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.23(c)(1): Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing (or the equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) on all open sides except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. The railing shall be provided with a toeboard wherever, beneath the open sides, (i) Persons can pass, (ii) There is moving machinery, or (iii) There is equipment with which falling materials could create a hazard. (a) Wastewater Treatment Plant, at bottom of Lime Silo - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to falling 7 and 12.625 feet due to the absence of standard guardrails in the following locations: (1) around the perimeter of both (two) metal grate platforms under the bottom of the Lime Silo; structural cross-braces for the silo's 9 x 9 foot frame only partially guarded portions of the two platforms, and (2) There were no guardrails for an 8 inch wide by ~30 inch long metal grate platform at the top of the 2nd vertical fixed ladder leading to the access platform at top of Slaker. (b) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, under north filter, on platform for North Filter Drive Motor - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to falling ~ 12 feet due to the absence of standard guardrails, and/or the lack of dual lanyards for 100% personal fall-arrest protection. (c) Phosphoric Acid Plant, on platform atop Fresh Water Holding Tank - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to falling 9 feet 10 inches due to the absence of standard guardrails on the east side of platform atop tank. (d) North Dock, cart platform at base of South Pivot Conveyor - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to falling up to 30 feet at the Northeast corner of the platform, between ladder and electrical cabinet JB-2. (e) North Dock, cart platform at base of North Pivot Conveyor - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to falling up to 30 feet at the Northeast corner of the platform, between ladder and corner of platform. (f) North Dock, North (upper) end of South Pivot Conveyor - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to falling up to 60 feet due to the presence of damaged guardrails and support posts for the last 5 feet of the 30 inch wide platform atop the conveyor's boom/support structure, and/or the lack of dual lanyards for 100% personal fall-arrest protection. (g) North Dock, metal grate walkway along left side of South Pivot Conveyor - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to falling up to 60 feet due to the 4th and 5th vertical support posts (from the upper end) being damaged from rust and separated from the walkway. (h) North Dock, at South Stiff Leg Turning Gear Platform - On or about June 21, 2012 employees servicing the heel pin of the South Stiff Leg Derrick's boom were exposed to falling 20 to 25 feet due to the absence of standard guardrails on the expanded metal deck on east and west sides of the heel pin, nor was personal fall-arrest equipment used. (i) DAP Plant, access platform to Primary Spray Man-way at Primary Scrubber - On or about June 26, 2012 employees were exposed to falling 19 feet 6 inches due to the absence of standard guardrails on the East side of access platform to Primary Spray Man-way at Primary Scrubber. (j) DAP Plant, bottom floor, platform for the 400 horsepower dryer drive motor - On or about June 26, 2012 employees were exposed to falling 62 1/2 to 68 inches due to the absence of standard guardrails on the West and South sides of this platform. (k) Phosphoric Rock Reclaim Belt - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to falling ~24 feet due to the absence of a mid-rail on the East side of the platform at top of Phosphoric-Rock Reclaim Belt. (l) DAP Plant, on East side of elevated maintenance platform atop Primary Seal Tank - On or about June 26, 2012 employees were exposed to falling 15 feet 3 inches due to the absence of mid-rails on either side of the fixed access ladder. This platform is accessed weekly to change out the black 30% make-up line. (m) North Dock, South Winch House - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to fall hazards due to missing mid-rails below handrails on either side of the winch line(s) at west end of South Winch House. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01004 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100024 B |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
4 |
| Nr Exposed |
12 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.24(b): "Where fixed stairs are required." Fixed stairs shall be provided for access from one structure level to another where operations necessitate regular travel between levels, and for access to operating platforms at any equipment which requires attention routinely during operations. Fixed stairs shall also be provided where access to elevations is daily or at each shift for such purposes as gauging, inspection, regular maintenance, etc., where such work may expose employees to acids, caustics, gases, or other harmful substances, or for which purposes the carrying of tools or equipment by hand is normally required. (It is not the intent of this section to preclude the use of fixed ladders for access to elevated tanks, towers, and similar structures, overhead traveling cranes, etc., where the use of fixed ladders is common practice.) Spiral stairways shall not be permitted except for special limited usage and secondary access situations where it is not practical to provide a conventional stairway. Winding stairways may be installed on tanks and similar round structures where the diameter of the structure is not less than five (5) feet. (a) Waste Water Treatment Plant, accessing pH probes - On or about August 22, 2012, employees were exposed to falling 40 3/4 inches, 17 feet 10 inches, or into the tanks while accessing, cleaning, calibrating and replacing pH probes due to the absence of fixed stairs in the following locations: 1. on Southwest quadrant of #1 Mixing Tank 2. on Southwest quadrant of #1 Clarifier 3. on East side of #2 Mixing Tank 4. on East side of #3 Mixing Tank AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01005 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100027 D03 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
2700.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
2700.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
2 |
| Nr Exposed |
8 |
| Gravity |
1 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.27(d)(3): "Ladder extensions." The side rails of through or side-step ladder extensions shall extend 3 1/2 feet above parapets and landings. For through ladder extensions, the rungs shall be omitted from the extension and shall have not less than 18 nor more than 24 inches clearance between rails. For side-step or offset fixed ladder sections, at landings, the side rails and rungs shall be carried to the next regular rung beyond or above the 3 1/2 feet minimum (fig. D-10). FIGURE D-10. - Offset Fixed Ladder Sections (For Figure D-10, http://www.osha.gov/OshStd_gif/10dfd_10.gif) (a) Wastewater Treatment Plant, beneath Lime Silo - On or about June 14, 2012 employees climbing either of two vertical fixed metal ladders to metal grate platforms were exposed to falls due to the side rails of the ladders not extending 3 1/2 feet (42 inches)above their respective landings as follows: (1) 1st platform above ground: ladder side rails extended only 29 7/8 inches above platform; fall distance was 7 feet 1 inch to ground; and (2) 2nd platform above ground: ladder side rails extended only 25 inches above platform; fall distance was 12.625 feet to the ground. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01006 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100119 E03 III |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
1 |
| Nr Exposed |
32 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(iii): The process hazard analysis shall address: Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases. (Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors.); (a) Sulfuric Acid Plant battery limits near the LPS Ammonia Tank, in and around the Ingersoll Rand Ammonia Compressor Pad area and the ammonia transfer pumps - On or about June 27, 2012 employees working in and around the IR Ammonia Compressor, and the ammonia transfer pumps, were exposed to being overcome by ammonia vapors due to the absence of an ammonia detection and early warning alarm system for these areas. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01007 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100119 J04 I |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
1 |
| Nr Exposed |
227 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(i): Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment. (a) Throughout MPC's Pascagoula, MS facility where anhydrous ammonia is utilized - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to the potential release of anhydrous ammonia due to the employer's failure to inspect and test all pressure relief devices in ammonia service, i.e.: 1. PSV#6, size 20", on top of LPS Tank ST-1-2: Date Changed: 6/9/2005; Date Due Change: 6/9/2008 2. PSV#7, size 8", on top of LPS Tank ST-1-2: Date Changed: 1/31/05; Date Due Change: 1/31/2008 3. PSV#9, size 3/4", on Suction Drum: Date Changed: 5/3/2007; Date Due Change: 5/3/2010 4. PSV#13, size 1/2", on Heater Inlet: Date Changed: 10/14/2004; Date Due Change: 10/21/2007 5. PSV#34, size 3/4", on Vent NH3 Stg.: Date Changed: 5/3/2007; Date Due Change: 5/3/2010 6. PSV#35, size 3/4", on P1A-2 Discharge: Date Changed: 5/27/2009; Date Due Change: 5/27/2012 7. PSV#41, size 3/4", on ISOMAX: Date Changed: 8/11/2008; Date Due Change: 8/11/2011 8. PSV#42, size 3/4", on ISOMAX: Date Changed: 8/11/2008; Date Due Change: 8/11/2011 9. PSV#46, size 3/4", on ISOMAX: Date Changed: 11/13/2007; Date Due Change: 11/13/2010 10. PSV#57, size 1/2", on 2" line above S.H.: Date Changed: 1/15/2009; Date Due Change: 1/15/2011 11. PSV#58,size 1/2", on 2" Line to Top of Tank: Date Changed: 1/15/2009;Date Due Change: 1/15/2011 12. PSV#61 ,size 3/4", at Rail & Truck: Date Changed: 6/1/2007;Date Due Change: 6/1/2010 13. PSV#70, 3/4", 2"Truck Supply Line to N.S.Hs: Date Changed:10/29/2008 ;Date Due Change:10/ 29/2011 14. PSV#78, 3/4", Truck Loading Station: Date Changed: 4/29/2009; Date Due Change: 4/29/2012 15. PSV#82, 3/4", 4" Liquid Letdown Line (e.run): Date Changed: 2/9/2011; Date Due Change: 2/9/2012 (Yearly) (b) Throughout MPC's Pascagoula, MS facility where anhydrous ammonia is utilized - On or about July 23, 2012 employees were exposed to the potential release of anhydrous ammonia due to the employer's failure to inspect and test all pressure vessels in ammonia service, i.e.: 1. 1st Stage Drum, D-1-2 2. 1st Stage After Cooler, E-1-2 3. Flash Drum - Intermediate Stage, D-2-2 4. Ammonia Condenser, E-2-2 5. Ammonia Transfer Heater (heat exchanger), E-3-2 6. Ammonia Loading Heater (heat exchanger), E-6-2 7. Ammonia Vaporizer, E-3 8. Ammonia Unloading Heater (heat exchanger), (No Number) 9. Inert Purge Condenser, E-5-2 AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01008 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100212 A01 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
2 |
| Nr Exposed |
21 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.212(a)(1): Types of guarding. One or more methods of machine guarding shall be provided to protect the operator and other employees in the machine area from hazards such as those created by point of operation, ingoing nip points, rotating parts, flying chips and sparks. Examples of guarding methods are-barrier guards, two-hand tripping devices, electronic safety devices, etc. (a) Phosphoric Rock Reclaim Belt - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to being caught by &/or falling into unguarded belt-roller nip points due to the absence of guards across those contact points on both the East & West sides of the platform at top of Phos-Rock Reclaim Belt. (b) Phosphoric Rock Reclaim Belt - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to being caught by &/or falling into exposed (unguarded) rotating shaft sections on the East & West sides of the head-roller at top of Phos-Rock Reclaim Belt due to the absence of guards over those shaft sections . AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01009 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100219 C02 I |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
20 |
| Nr Exposed |
29 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.219(c)(2)(i): All exposed parts of horizontal shafting seven (7) feet or less from floor or working platform, excepting runways used exclusively for oiling, or running adjustments, shall be protected by a stationary casing enclosing shafting completely or by a trough enclosing sides and top or sides and bottom of shafting as location requires. (a) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, North & South Blower Deck - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in partially-guarded rotating horizontal shafting at the following locations: (1) Drive motor for South Scrubber Blower, East and West of bearing blocks, and (2) Drive motor for North Scrubber Blower, East and West of bearing blocks . (b) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, deck over #3 Digester - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in partially-guarded rotating horizontal shafts between motors and gearboxes at the following agitator drive units: (1) at drive motor for #1 agitator over Digester #3, (2) at drive motor for #2 agitator over Digester #3, (3) at drive motor for #3 agitator over Digester #3, (4) at drive motor for #4 agitator over Digester #3, (c) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, deck over Digester #4 - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in partially-guarded rotating horizontal shafts at the following agitator drive units: (1) at drive motor for #1 agitator over Digester #4 (2) at drive motor for #2 agitator over Digester #4 (3) at drive motor for #3 agitator over Digester #4 (4) at drive motor for #4 agitator over Digester #4 (d) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, 42% Phos-Acid Tank, ground level - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in partially-guarded rotating horizontal shaft at motor #E1024 driving the North pump (e) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Rock Mill area, East of Rock Slurry Tank - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in partially-guarded rotating horizontal shafts at: (1) the South Slurry Pump (from Rock Slurry Tank to Phos-Acid Plant), and (2) the North Slurry Pump (from Rock Slurry Tank to Phos-Acid Plant) (f) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, North side, ground level - On or about June 15, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in an unguarded rotating horizontal shaft at the #4 Vacuum Cooler Feed Pump, (g) Wastewater Treatment Plant, North of Belt Filter Press at Re-Slurry Pump - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in two separate sections of unguarded horizontal shaft at the Re-Slurry Pump due to the drive belt guard not being wide enough to totally enclose the rotating shaft, and there being no guard over the pump housing openings. (h) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Rock Mill area - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by unguarded horizontal rotating shafting on either side of the bearing housing at the Rock Product Pump #1 (i) Rock Mill Yard, at elevated end of Dock Unloading Belt - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in 2 3/4 inches of unguarded rotating horizontal shaft because the old shaft and coupling guard was too narrow. (j) DAP Plant, Drag Flight Deck, Drive Unit for Fines Belt - On or about June 26, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in a ~3 inch diameter horizontal rotating shaft driving the head pulley for the Fines Belt; it was unguarded for ~5 inches. (k) DAP Plant, Drag Flight Deck, at four (4) Cage Mills - On or about June 26, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in 4 1/2 to 7+ inch diameter horizontal rotating shafts driving four (4) Cage Mills. (l) Top of DAP Plant, at drive unit for Screens Feed Elevator - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in two unguarded sections of horizontal shafting due to the coupling guard not being wide enough to cover the rotating shaft between the blue motor and the Saturn Planetgear 7000 Speed Reducer. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01010 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100219 C03 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Current Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
2 |
| Nr Exposed |
8 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.219(c)(3): Guarding vertical and inclined shafting. Vertical and inclined shafting seven (7) feet or less from floor or working platform, excepting maintenance runways, shall be enclosed with a stationary casing in accordance with requirements of paragraphs (m) and (o) of this section. (a) Just North of MPC Guard House/Gate, at Potable Water Storage Tank - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in an unguarded vertical shaft for the automatic potable water pump through unguarded openings 12 inches wide by ~10-11 inches tall.. (b) South of Ammonia LPS Tank, at DAP Plant Ammonia Feed Pump - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by/in the unguarded vertical shaft between electric motor #E2180 and the DAP Plant Ammonia Feed Pump through unguarded openings 7 inches wide by 11 1/2 inches tall. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01011 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100219 C04 I |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
6 |
| Nr Exposed |
16 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.219(c)(4)(i): Projecting shaft ends shall present a smooth edge and end and shall not project more than one-half the diameter of the shaft unless guarded by nonrotating caps or safety sleeves. (a) Phos-Acid Plant, Rock Mill yard, Dock's Unloading Arm to Rock Pile, aka Stacker Conveyor - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by the 4 5/16 inch diameter shaft for the Stacker Conveyor's head pulley because the shaft had a 3 7/8 inch long x 3/4 inch x 3/4 inch keyway extension welded to it on the inclined walkway-side of head pulley. (b) DAP Storage, North Storage Product Conveyor, i.e., Head Pulley at the Transfer Belt from #5 Bulk Building to Long Dock Belt - On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded rotating 3 1/2 inch diameter X 8 1/2 inch long horizontal shaft which extended out over the walkway and was 67 1/2 inches above the floor. (c) North Dock, on North side of tail pulley for Conveyor #CV-3 - On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded rotating 4 3/4 inch diameter horizontal shaft which extended 4 inches beyond the bearing block, with three (3) square-head bolts protruding 13/16 inch each around the perimeter of the shaft; in addition, there was a 1 inch diameter X 3 inch long silver nipple extending outward from the center of the larger shaft extension. (d) North Dock, on South side of Conveyor #CV-3, near East end at Bend Roller "W" - On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded rotating 4 3/4 inch diameter horizontal shaft which extended 5 3/8 inches beyond the bearing block, with three (3) square-head bolts protruding 13/16 inch each around the perimeter of the shaft; in addition, there was a 1 inch diameter X 9 1/2 inch long nipple extending outward from the center of the larger shaft extension with a Speed Control Indicator attached. (e) North Dock, on South side of Conveyor #CV-3 near East end at Bend Roller E - On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded smooth rotating 3 7/8 inch diameter horizontal shaft which extended 3 inches beyond the bearing block. (f) DAP to Dock Long Conveyor Belt, South side of its West end - On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by the DAP to Dock Long Conveyor Belt Drive Unit's Tail Roller Shaft; the shaft was an unguarded, smooth, rotating 6 inch diameter horizontal shaft, the centerline of which was 19 1/2 inches above the walkway; the shaft extended horizontally for 4 3/4 inches beyond the bearing block, and was 18 inches from the walkway's guardrail. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01012 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100219 E01 I |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
2 |
| Nr Exposed |
1 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.219(e)(1)(i): Where both runs of horizontal belts are seven (7) feet or less from the floor level, the guard shall extend to at least fifteen (15) inches above the belt or to a standard height, except that where both runs of a horizontal belt are 42 inches or less from the floor, the belt shall be fully enclosed in accordance with paragraphs (m) and (o) of this section. (a) Phos-acid Plant, Rock Mill Area, East of Slurry Tank - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught in four (4) unguarded horizontal V-belts driving the Rock Mill Sump Pump for Pond Water. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01013 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100219 I02 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
11 |
| Nr Exposed |
26 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.219(i)(2): Couplings. Shaft couplings shall be so constructed as to present no hazard from bolts, nuts, setscrews, or revolving surfaces. Bolts, nuts, and setscrews will, however, be permitted where they are covered with safety sleeves or where they are used parallel with the shafting and are countersunk or else do not extend beyond the flange of the coupling. (a) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, on catwalk across top of 30% Phosphoric-Acid Holding Tank, at agitator drive - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an partially guarded vertical shaft coupling accessible through east and west openings of housing atop gearbox. (b) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, northeast corner, ground level - On or about June 15, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded rotating coupling at the Filter Wash Water Pump, (c) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, North Gypsum Tank Agitator Drive - On or about June 15, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by unguarded horizontal and vertical rotating couplings, (d) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Northwest corner, ground level, North Filter Feed Pump - On or about June 15, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by unguarded rotating coupling and shaft, (e) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Northwest corner, ground level, South Filter Feed Pump - On or about June 15, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded rotating coupling and shaft, (f) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Northwest corner, ground level, #1 Vacuum Cooler Feed Pump - On or about June 15, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded rotating coupling, (g) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, catwalk across top of South 42% Phosphoric-Acid Tank - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by the agitator's unguarded rotating vertical coupling and shaft. (h) Wastewater Treatment Plant ,#1 Clarifier - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by unguarded rotating vertical and horizontal couplings at the #1 Rake Drive (vertical) and at the #1 Rake Lift Drive (horizontal). (i) Wastewater Treatment Plant, #2 Clarifier - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by unguarded rotating vertical and horizontal couplings at the #2 Rake Drive (vertical) and at the #2 Rake Lift Drive (horizontal). (j) Material Handling, South Dock, above Shuttle Conveyor to Ship, at Inclined Conveyor Drive Motor - On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by an unguarded rotating horizontal coupling and shaft with keyway, (k) South side of the Low Pressure (Ammonia) Storage Tank at Glycol Pump - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught by a partially-guarded horizontal rotating coupling because the "house-shaped guard" was not secured in place. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01014 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100303 B07 IV |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2012-12-13 |
| Current Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
3 |
| Nr Exposed |
8 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.303(b)(7)(iv): There shall be no damaged parts that may adversely affect safe operation or mechanical strength of the equipment, such as parts that are broken, bent, cut, or deteriorated by corrosion, chemical action, or overheating. (a) West of DAP Vaporizer - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to the inadequately guarded blades of the Storm Water Pump drive motor's fan, motor #E-1873, due to enlarged holes in its rusted cover. (b) East of Phosphoric-Acid Plant Maintenance Shop, at River Water Booster Pump Drive Motor - On or about June 15, 2012 employees were exposed to inadequately guarded fan blades at the South end of the River Water Booster Pump drive motor due to enlarged holes in its rusted wire mesh cover. (c) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Rock Mill Area, East of Slurry Tank, at Rock Mill Sump Pump for Pond Water - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to getting caught in fan blades of sump pump drive motor due to five (5) holes in the guard. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01015 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100303 C03 I |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
1 |
| Nr Exposed |
4 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.303(c)(3)(i): Conductors shall be spliced or joined with splicing devices identified for the use or by brazing, welding, or soldering with a fusible metal or alloy. Soldered splices shall first be spliced or joined to be mechanically and electrically secure without solder and then soldered. All splices and joints and the free ends of conductors shall be covered with an insulation equivalent to that of the conductors or with an insulating device identified for the purpose. (a) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, North side of platform for access to Clarifier Agitator Drive, at platform offset - On or about June 19, 2012, employees were exposed to a tripping hazard due to energized conductors having been crudely spliced together up through the metal grate platform, adjacent the Clarifier's Agitator Drive Motor, and had been left protruding 7-8 inches above the platform. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01016A |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100303 G02 I B |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2012-12-13 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
10 |
| Nr Exposed |
36 |
| Related Event Code (REC) |
Variance |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.303(g)(2)(i)(B): Except as elsewhere required or permitted by this standard, live parts of electric equipment operating at 50 volts or more shall be guarded against accidental contact by use of approved cabinets or other forms of approved enclosures or by any of the following means: By suitable permanent, substantial partitions or screens so arranged so that only qualified persons will have access to the space within reach of the live parts. Any openings in such partitions or screens shall be so sized and located that persons are not likely to come into accidental contact with the live parts or to bring conducting objects into contact with them: (a) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, North wall of South Filter Deck and #3 Vacuum Cooler Condenser, on West side of concrete column - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock because the outer faceplate was missing from a 120 VAC Crouse Hinds Rigid Metal Duplex Receptacle. (b) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, North Breaker Room, Southwest corner; inside panel labeled "240/110 Volt Lights and Power" - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock because the circuit-breaker at position #2 was missing, and there was no replacement knockout plate for the 2 1/4" X 3/4 inch opening. (c) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Rock Mill Control Room, Locker Room, West Wall - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to a missing face plate on a duplex outlet behind the Frigidaire Mini Refrigerator. (d) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, South Breaker Room, Bottom Floor, Incoming Line Section of Substation 4A, Section G - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to contact with live electrical parts at an Allen-Bradley Centerline MCC Panel, 600 VAC, 3 phase, 800 Amp, because the outer circuit-breaker handle and companion "On/Off" lights-box were missing, thus creating two side-by-side openings that were large enough for metal objects to enter and make contact with the energized bus bar. (e) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, South Breaker Room, Second Floor, Section B - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to contact with live electrical parts at an Allen-Bradley Centerline MCC Panel because the outer circuit-breaker handle was missing, thus creating an opening in the "Spare" at the right end. (f) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, South Breaker Room, Second Floor, Section D - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to contact with live electrical parts at an Allen-Bradley Centerline MCC Panel because the outer circuit-breaker handle was missing, thus creating an opening in the "Spare" near the middle of the section; and a bulb and green cover were missing from the on/off indicator. (g) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Rock Mill Control Room, back side of metal control-board enclosure, West side - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to a missing face plate on a duplex outlet supplying current to monitors on front of the control-board. (h) Electrical Room for Bulk #5 (New Storage Building)- On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to electrical shock because the circuit-breaker at space #39 was missing, and there was no replacement knockout plate for the 2 1/4" X 3/4 inch opening in the Siemens Type 1 panel. (i) DAP Plant, Screen Deck, at the Discharge Dust Screw above the Granulator - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to an unguarded electrical conduit elbow which was missing its end cover plate which left spliced, energized conductors outside the conduit and accessible. (j) Automotive Shop, South Car Hoist, West side - On or about June 28, 2012 employees were exposed to electrical shock at the duplex outlet located on the West side of the car hoist due to the receptacle face plate having a V-shaped plug broken out. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01016B |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100303 G02 I D |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
0.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
2 |
| Nr Exposed |
8 |
| Gravity |
10 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.303(g)(2)(i)(D): Except as elsewhere required or permitted by this standard, live parts of electric equipment operating at 50 volts or more shall be guarded against accidental contact by use of approved cabinets or other forms of approved enclosures or by any of the following means: (D) By elevation of 2.44 m (8.0 ft) or more above the floor or other working surface. (a) DAP Plant, top of #3 Bulk Storage Building, at North end of East Shuttle Conveyor - On or about June 27, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock & burns from the following: (1) the unguarded light bulb which was located 6 feet 4.5 inches above the metal walkway, and 8 feet horizontally from the dump chute, and (2) the unguarded third light bulb from North end, which was 7 feet 1/2 inch above the metal walkway. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01017 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100304 A02 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2012-12-13 |
| Current Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
3600.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
1 |
| Nr Exposed |
12 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.304(a)(2): Polarity of connections. No grounded conductor may be attached to any terminal or lead so as to reverse designated polarity. (a) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, North wall of South Filter Deck and #3 Vacuum Cooler Condenser, attached to West side of an I-beam - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock because the polarity had been reversed at a 120 VAC Crouse Hinds Rigid Metal Duplex Receptacle, whose outer faceplate was also missing. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
01018 |
| Citaton Type |
Serious |
| Standard Cited |
19100304 G05 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2013-01-07 |
| Current Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
4500.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
5 |
| Nr Exposed |
17 |
| Gravity |
5 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.304(g)(5): Grounding path. The path to ground from circuits, equipment, and enclosures shall be permanent, continuous, and effective. (a) Wastewater Treatment Plant, Polymer Shed - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to there being an open (no) ground at the Reddot Duplex Outlet supplying power to the #1 Polymer Mixer Drive Motor and Polymer Feed Pump. (b) Warehouse, South of Receiving Desk - On or about June 13, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to the absence of a grounding conductor prong on the cord/plug of a 42 inch diameter Air Master Fan Company Model EMC-42D floor fan. (c) Material Handling, #3 Bulk Screen Deck - On or about June 21, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to the absence of a grounding conductor prong on the cord/plug of a 44 inch diameter TPI Industrial Fan. (d) Automotive Shop, South of South Car Hoist - On or about June 28, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to the absence of a grounding conductor prong on the cord/plug of a 48 inch diameter, 120 VAC, 15 Amp TPI Corporation, Model PBS 48-D Industrial Fan. (e) General Plant Maintenance Building, Southwest corner - On or about June 28, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to the absence of a grounding conductor prong on the cord/plug of a Power Wise EZGO-Textron 36 Volt Battery Charger, Serial Number 71510, which was used to charge the batteries of Golf Cart #8. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
02001 |
| Citaton Type |
Other |
| Standard Cited |
19100303 F02 |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
0.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
1 |
| Nr Exposed |
2 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.303(f)(2): Services, feeders, and branch circuits. Each service, feeder, and branch circuit, at its disconnecting means or overcurrent device, shall be legibly marked to indicate its purpose, unless located and arranged so the purpose is evident. (a) Inside Automotive Shop, Southeast corner, and North of Office - On or about June 28, 2012 employees were exposed to electric shock due to the absence of labeling for four (4) 20 Amp circuit-breakers in a Siemens Type 3R Outdoor Load Center. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
|
| Citation ID |
02002 |
| Citaton Type |
Other |
| Standard Cited |
19100305 G02 III |
| Issuance Date |
2012-11-20 |
| Abatement Due Date |
2012-12-13 |
| Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Initial Penalty |
0.0 |
| Final Order |
2012-12-12 |
| Nr Instances |
8 |
| Nr Exposed |
19 |
| FTA Current Penalty |
0.0 |
| Citation text line |
29 CFR 1910.305(g)(2)(iii): Flexible cords and cables shall be connected to devices and fittings so that strain relief is provided that will prevent pull from being directly transmitted to joints or terminal screws. (a) Machine Shop, East Side - On or about June 13, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out due to the absence of strain relief at the male attachment plug on the cord to the TPI 42 inch diameter fan which was plugged in atop the Monarch Lathe. (b) Machine Shop, West Side, South end of Acer Lathe - On or about June 13, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out due to the absence of strain relief where the power cord attaches to the switch on front of a blue TPI 42 inch diameter fan, with the initials "BH." (c) Wastewater Treatment Plant, Polymer Shed - On or about June 14, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out because the motor leads for the #1 Polymer Mixer Drive Motor were enclosed inside flexible conduit, which was not connected to the junction box attached to the side of the motor. A nut was needed inside the junction box to secure the plastic connector to the box, but it was missing - allowing strain to be exerted on the motor leads. (d) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, at Northwest corner of Splitter Box Platform - On or about June 19, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out due to the cable-box entrance fitting (strain-relief connector) having broken out of a fiberglass junction box creating strain on a heavy duty flexible cable of 4 conductors plus a ground. (e) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Rock Mill yard, Dock's Unloading Arm to Rock Pile, aka Stacker Conveyor - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out due to the absence of strain relief where two separate 4-conductor Metal Clad Cables enter the gray metal junction box located at the base of the Stacker Conveyor, on its inclined-platform side. (f) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, Rock Mill Control Room, at male plug connected to duplex outlet on West inside wall of metal control-board enclosure - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out due to a plastic flex-tie exerting pressure to two joined flexible conductors at a point below the duplex outlet; this pressure was causing the plugged-in cord to pull loose from its strain relief device at its yellow replacement plug, which was supplying current to monitors on the front of the control-board. (g) Phosphoric-Acid Plant, at Rock Mill Storm Water Sump Pump - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out due to the absence of strain relief where two separate 4-conductor, black, flexible metal conduits enter: (1) the bottom of the gray Allen-Bradley sump pump motor switch box, and (2) the bottom of the larger Allen-Bradley switch for the agitator motor. (h) North Dock, South Winch House, North side of winch - On or about June 20, 2012 employees were exposed to cord pull out due to the absence of strain relief where a 4-conductor, black, flexible metal conduit enters the winch brake solenoid. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE ABATEMENT METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO: |
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